Saturday, 24 October 2015

The United States Air Force, The Joint Intelligence Committee, And A Top Secret UFO Report


Anyone familiar with the United States Air Force’s (USAF) early response to the UFO phenomenon should be familiar with at least a handful of reports, letters and memoranda written to-and-from several extremely senior-ranking officers of the USAF. The famous “Twining Letter” springs to mind. Lt. Gen. Nathan Twining’s classified three page masterpiece, written in September, 1947, to the mighty Brig. Gen. George Schulgen outlined that the current opinion of the Air Material Command (AMC) on UFO’s was that “the phenomenon reported is something real and not visionary or fictitious”. The document itself has been reproduced from the holdings the National Archives countless times in books and on websites, so much so that even many casual readers on the UFO subject have seen it in its some form. There are scores of powerful and potent records, signed by the highest ranking military officers in America and only ever meant for restricted readership.

However, there are some documents of, I believe, equal importance, which have not been seen by a wide audience, yet their contents are just as vital to piecing together the early history of how the US military handled the UFO conundrum. One such document is titled “Report by the Director of Intelligence, USAF, to the Joint Intelligence Committee on Unidentified Aerial Objects” and was issued on April 27, 1949, classified Top Secret. I believe this is the first time this document has been available for a wide audience to see in its original form.

In the bulky 1949 USAF’s Director of Intelligence “General Correspondence” file of nearly 2000 pages regarding the topic of “Flying Discs”, there exist various papers containing references to a special report the USAF had written for the US’s Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), which was headed by representatives of the main intelligence agencies of each military service. Like so many USAF Intelligence files, researchers for Citizens Against UFO Secrecy (CAUS) had assumed that this yet unseen report was classified “Secret” and attempted to obtain it under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) from 1984 onwards.

After 13 years of searching, the JIC report was finally found in 1997 at the National Archives II in Maryland by researcher Jan Aldrich. Specifically, it languished in the USAF Director of Intelligence file entitled “General File, July 1945 - December 1954: Records Relating to the Requirements for and the Collection and Dissemination of Intelligence”.  The report had not been found previously because it had been classified “Top Secret” and was not held in the “Secret” records previously checked by the National Archives during previous in response to FOIA requests.  The Archives rarely searches when dealing with FOIA requests, especially when the topic is UFO’s.

In the words of the Center for UFO Studies (CUFOS):

“The Air Force sent an “Unidentified Aerial Objects” presentation, classified Top Secret, with an Appendix – a summary of Air Force actions – to the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) on April 27, 1949.;

And,

“The JIC document has eluded researchers for years. In it one can see the seeds of the later Project Grudge report. It contains a summarized history of the Air Force’s early attempt to investigate UFO reports.”

I do not attempt here to analyse the contents of this report. Others can, and have, done a better job than I could do. The purpose of presenting this document here is simply to get the actual material out for all to see. Having said that, I would like to highlight three of the more persuasive statements in the report:

“16. c.  Creditable unexplained incidents which might involve the use of atomic powered craft of u[nu]sual design should be considered jointly by the Atomic Energy Commission and highly competent aerodynamicists to determine the necessity for further consideration of such incidents by National Defense Intelligence Agencies.”;

“17. The majority of reported incidents are reliable to the extent that they have involved the sighting of some object or light phenomenon.”;

“19. There are numerous reports from reliable and competent observers for which a conclusive explanation has not been made. Some of these involve descriptions which would place them in the category of new manifestations of probable natural phenomena but others involve configurations and described performance which might conceivably represent an advanced aerodynamical development…”

Finally, I wish to thank researchers Barry Greenwood and Jan Aldrich for making available this file, and my good friend Shayne Ford for his computer assistance. At 8 pages, presented below is the “Report by the Director of Intelligence, USAF, to the Joint Intelligence Committee on Unidentified Aerial Objects”.









Sunday, 18 October 2015

 The CIA's Unreleased, Unacknowledged UFO Files: 

Just How Many More Are There?


          So!! It appears that after 40 years, there are still government documents to be found regarding the infamous and still unsolved aerial incursions over nearly a dozen key nuclear armed military bases all over North America. Known as the “1975 Over Flights”, the first sensitive location to be harassed by unknown craft was Loring Air Force Base in Maine. Hundreds of pages of documents were begrudgingly released to researchers in the late 1970s, but many were not. Below is a one page “Event and Action” log of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) providence that, as far as I know, has not been seen before by researchers.


How this came about was that recently I’ve been spending some time on the CIA’s electronic search engine known as “CIA Records Search Tool”, or “CREST”. I usually don’t search the archive using keywords like “unusual flying object”, “unidentified flying object”, “unknown object”, etc as these have been attempted ad nauseam by others. What I do attempt are keywords that possibly no one else has thought or doing bothered to do: anything associated with extremely well-known UFO cases or investigations, such as “Mansfield”, “JAL 1628”, “Kirtland OSI”, etc is a good start.

One successful hit using this method was using the keyword “Loring”. The significant file details of the result read:

Title: UNTITLED (DISCUSSES PENETRATION OF LORING AFB, MAINE)
Document Number: (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005516212
Release Decision: RIFPUB
Original Classification: U
Document Page Count: 1
Document Release Date: January 31, 2011
Case Number: F-2010-00651
Publication Date: October 28, 1975

From here, the document is viewable in PDF form, which I imaged above.

As the reader will have noticed, the title banner tells us that the document is from the CIA’s Operations Centre. The line-itemed date is listed as 28th October, 1975, and the main box of information is headed “Event and Action”. All of the log entries are redacted (in white for once) except the second last one. The time given is 06:10 and the text states:

“NMCC Rep notified Ops Ctr that DDO Talker contained update concerning penetration of Loring AFB, Maine by unidentified helicopters(s) flying out of Canada. Received copy via LDX and disseminated.”

For clarity, “NMCC”  is the National Military Command Center; “DDO” is is Deputy Directior of Operations; “Talker” is raw,  intelligence text, written in a way somewhat akin to human speech; and, last, but most importantly, “Loring AFB” is Loring Air Force Base. The content of the document may not be earth shattering itself, but it’s all the evidence I need to show that there may be more such material in CIA possession – whether available to the public or still under lock-and-key – which has not been appraised by researchers.

So what’s it all about? Although mothballed today, in 1975 Loring AFB was a huge United States Air Force (USAF) base run by the old Strategic Air Command (SAC). Of considerable size, the base was a storage site for nuclear weapons. The arsenal was stored in a specialized,  secured area consisting of small huts, known as “igloos”. The facility was patrolled day and night by the 42nd Security Police Squadron. On October 27 and 28, 1975, unidentified aircraft aggressively buzzed the base, taking particular interest in the nuclear weapons storage area and causing the base to nervously go to a high-alert status. Shortly before 8pm, on the Oct. 27, an airman patrolling the weapons dump area saw an unidentified aircraft nearing the north perimeter of the base at an altitude of about 300 feet, its red navigational light and a white strobe light in operation. At exactly the same time, the Loring ABF control tower got a clear radar paint from an unknown aircraft 10 to 13 miles east-northeast of the base. Numerous attempts were made to contact the aircraft, but there was no response. It came within 300 yards of the base nuclear weapons area. The base went into a full alert mode and an intense ground sweep was conducted by security personnel. The intruder circled for about 40 minutes before heading toward Grand Falls in Canada, some where it dropped from the radar screen. The next night featured a repeat performance, only weirder. This time, airmen reported seeing a silent orange-and-red object shaped like an elongated football hovering over the runway. It was described as being about four car lengths long, solid, with no doors or windows, and with no visible propellers or engines. It eventually departed in the direction of Grand Falls.

This, and similar incidents – some far more potent and unexplainable - were occurring above and around USAF bases, usually operated by SAC, or otherwise housing operational nuclear weapons, all over the United States for weeks, and then sporadically into 1976. The others were, as amazing as it may seem, Wurtsmith AFB, Malmstrom AFB, Minot AFB, Grand Forks AFB, Eglin AFB, Fort Richie, Cannon AFB and Falconbridge Air Station in Canada! Released documents indicate that Selfridge and Plattsburg AFB’s were also affected by unknown intruders too, though we don’t have any details. Oh, and possibly one base in Alaska. How do we know any of this? In probably the most stunning successes in the quest for government UFO documents, Barry Greenwood, Lawrence Fawcett and Robert Todd, and a few others, successfully urged various areas of the US military to release respective historical records regarding these events. Collectively, these documents paint a picture of multiple unknown aerial intrusions against some of the most supposedly secure facilities operated by the strongest military on the planet.

So, with regards to my finding just one document positively sourced from the CIA, we now have concrete proof that even the CIA was knowledgeable concerning all this USAF base intrusion business. The job now is to look far deeper into the CIA record and hopefully discover what other material was received or created by them over the long years. It’s not even like researchers are going on a hunch. For example, when research group Ground Saucer Watch (GSW) successfully forced the CIA to release some 900 pages of UFO records in 1978, researcher Brad Sparks determined that over 200 extra documents were directly referenced in those 900 pages, but conveniently not included in the release. In other words, the CIA couldn’t find, or, chose not to find, at least 200 documents it they could or should have. The CIA were effectively thumbing their noses at the Washington DC’s District.

As for the Loring Air Force Base, and the whole 1975 over flight fiasco, for those interested, the definitive account of the evolution of this story can be found in the 1984 blockbuster book Clear Intent by Barry Greenwood and Lawrence Fawcett, and republished UFOs the Government Cover-Up in 1990. Imaged below is the front cover of the book in its original guise. Readers perhaps wouldn’t be surprised to learn that it is one of my favourites UFO books. 


Thursday, 8 October 2015

No Love From The Royal Australian Navy


            Be forewarned. This is the driest, most “essentially non-UFO” blog post I have yet published. If anyone wants thrilling tales of pilots being dragged off by formations of glittering unknown objects they will have to close this and pick up Keith Chester’s “Strange Company” or something. For the few who want to risk sticking with me, let me sum up something I have being banging on about for nearly a year: The Royal Australian Air Force’s (RAAF) Surveillance and Response Group, or rather, its subordinate Wings, are tasked with the surveillance and monitoring of our country’s vast aerospace environment. RAAF assets track and identify both known and unknown aircraft, and other airborne bodies, plus provide the wider Australian Defence Force’s a true and timely aerospace picture of what is flying above and around the continent. An unknown or unidentifiable track is titled, at least within the 41 Wing, as a “Contact of Interest”. My work on this matter can be appraised here:


http://ufos-documenting-the-evidence.blogspot.com.au/2015/02/obtaining-actual-contacts-of-interest.html

            But what about the Royal Australian Navy? A modern Navy has just the sort of aerial detection and plotting capability as its equivalent Air Force. What a state of affairs we would be in if our Navy sailed blind while our Air Force was able to pick up and near-continuously plot small planes two thousand kilometres away (which they can) using a world-leading over-the-horizon radar system? So, if the RAAF sometimes picks up “Contacts of Interest”, what does the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) manage to do? For example, our Anzac class frigates have an entire “suite” of radar systems that produce a variety of combined three-dimensional imaging that facilitate hostile aircraft tracking, theatre-wide battle management, etc. The two systems of interest to us are the Raytheon SPS-49[V]8 ANZ for sensitive aerial search and long-range surveillance, and, the CelsiusTech 9LV-453 TIR Radar for general, especially mid-range, aerial scanning. So with all this fool-proof ability to monitor the skies, one would assume that the odd UFO – whatever UFO means exactly – could and should be detected.

On the 17 September, 2015 I submitted the following FOI request to the Department of Defence’s Freedom of Information (FOI) desk:

“I wish to obtain a list or index of any operational Standing Instructions, Standing Orders, Manuals, Directives, or any publications, maintained by the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) which relate to the detection, tracking and identification of known or unknown aircraft, unidentified aircraft, hostile aircraft, hijacked aircraft, unlawfully operating aircraft, and matters related generally to air and aerospace surveillance, monitoring and sovereignty.”

Some of you may wonder why I would want to merely get an index, which is basically a list, of a whole lot of our Navy’s paperwork. Why wouldn’t I go straight for the good stuff? Well, it doesn’t work that way. A person requesting information from a government agency must be quite specific. In the case I am highlighting here, all I want to do is get a list of Navy publications that may have words like “unknown contact” or “suspect track” or whatever in the title. It would be then that I would ask, again under the FOI Act, for the publications themselves to be released. And that would be when things get interesting. The world’s greatest UFO-document FOI user and abuser, Robert Todd, now sadly not with us, used to do this all the time. And the volume of material that he was able to identify from such lists of military publications is quite impressive. Anyway, back came an answer to my FOI request on the 21st of September. In part it stated:

“A preliminary assessment of charges was sought from the departmental area which would be responsible for the processing of your request. However, in response to their own preliminary inquiries they do not consider your request is valid in its current form, essentially because there is no ‘list or index’ which covers all of the requested information.

The type of information requested is spread across a large range of publications including classified Allied publications. Given the types of operating environment for our ships, there is no simple short list of instructions like that cited for the RAAF. The request is so broad as to encompass a wide spectrum of operations from basic training of our people to highly complex and classified instructions issued to cover specific Operations and Exercises.

For example, the Anti-Air Warfare Procedures chapter of one of Navy’s Maritime tactical publications is highly classified and is 334 pages. While not all of the chapter is relevant to your request, it would be a considerable cost to you for the Department to review the entire content, and then it is unlikely that much information would be released.

To produce a ‘list or index’, the Department would need to construct a document which is outside of the scope of the FOI Act as described in para 2.29 of the Guidelines issued by the Australian Information Commissioner under s 93A of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Oct 2014). In this case, the expected decision would be to refuse access under section 24A [Requests may be refused if documents cannot be found, do not exist or have not been received] of the FOI Act, as the requested ‘list or index’ does not exist.

In view of the above, you are invited to consider, whether your request may be refined to more specified terms.”

            So, the RAN are basically saying that, unlike the RAAF, there are no concise, short list of publications – Standing Orders, Instructions, Directives, etc – that would satisfy my request. Furthermore, they are saying that the situation with operational and tactical RAN publications is so complex that no list would be even creatable or manageable. I found, and continue to find, that claim a bit hard to believe; however, I have it on good authority from a serving member of our Australian Defence Forces – who never lets me down – that the Navy’s procedural paperwork is a full order of magnitude more complicated than the RAAF’s or the Army’s. So, this time the benefit of the doubt goes their way, but that doesn’t get them off the hook as far as me reducing the scope of my FOI request and raising the bar somewhat.

On the 4th of October I replied to Defence FOI and stated that I wanted the same type of material, but this time only for the Anzac class frigate. In other words, I want a list of enforceable RAN publications that relate to unknown or unidentifiable aircraft or other airborne bodies, but only created for the particular systems on the Anzac ships. Simple right? Maybe not… The reply came back on the 7th of October, and, in it, the Navy stated directly to me:

“The applicant’s revised request below and his additional explanation does not significantly change his original request. As such, I consider this request remains a s24A response in that no list or index exists and to produce one would be contrary to the guidance provided by the Information Commissioner in para 2.29 of the Guidelines issued by the Australian Information Commissioner under s 93A of the Freedom of Information Act 1982. Similarly, to provide a list of publications, as alternatively requested by the applicant, would also require the production of a document.

Additionally, there is a set of Anzac Class Standing Orders which facilitate standard procedures across the eight ships of the class. These Orders are generally unclassified and cover routine management instructions rather than the types of information requested by the applicant and they specifically do not address operational procedures.

The applicant’s requested information goes to the very core of Navy’s warfare role. Navy’s combat systems, procedures and operations are all developed around the ultimate use of warships, that being combat. As such, most warfare related material is in classified operating manuals and combat system manuals. Further, a great deal of this material is generated through classified Allied publications which are imperative to enabling our ships, submarines and aircraft to readily interact and operate with other Allied forces. RAN warships are not like RAAF Air Traffic Control and other fixed installations which predominantly operate in a civil type regime; our ships operate in warfare regimes which are occasionally used in non-warfare roles such as Humanitarian Assistance and/or Disaster Relief.

Detection and Tracking of contacts: This part of the request essentially asks how we get to the identification of contacts/targets with Anzac Class ships. The Australian publications which cover system descriptions and use of the Anzac Class combat system are principally divided into 12 Volumes/Parts. I have sampled four (33%) of these and they are 612, 758, 838 and 1148 pages, resulting in an average of 840 pages per Volume/Part or a total or approximately 10,080 total pages. While naturally not all of the information will be relevant to the applicant’s request, it would be a considerable body of work, and probably a s24AA diversion of resources, just to review the documents to ascertain which content which might be relevant to the request. These publications are all classified, and even if within the scope of the FOI request, would very likely be heavily redacted to the point where any released information would be meaningless.

Identification of contacts: At its core, Air Warfare Identification Criteria is contained in a small section (11 pages) of a Combined Exercise Agreement which carries a NATO security classification which would essentially prevent its release under FOI. This core ID Criteria is then distilled into other Australian warfare publications which describe how these criteria are applied in our operating environment and systems. My previous advice regarding the content of RAN Maritime Tactical Instructions remains valid, in that the Anti-Air Warfare section is 343 pages. 45 pages of this section directly relate to Anzac Class operations and some other pages are indirectly relevant. Again, this is a highly classified document.”

Below this RAN response, the FOI desk officer finished the correspondence with this:

“In view of the above, you are again invited to consider whether your request may be refined in more specific terms. The department is only obliged to assist an applicant once to frame a suitable application under the FOI Act. However, in order to assist you we are prepared to extend this obligation.

Your request will be classified as ‘Pending’ until such time as your reply is received. However, if we do not receive any further contact from you by 12 October 2015, we will consider your request has having been withdrawn.  Notwithstanding, you are welcome to submit a fresh application after that date.”

So.. That is what we are up to. I do not usually post my research endeavours until they are wrapped up. This one however will probably go nowhere. It’s not worth the fight sometimes. Having said that, I am not quite through with them yet. Stay tuned.